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Note: DR 7-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Applied to the Government "Party"
A welfare recipient who has been notified that her benefits
are being terminated asks an attorney to represent her at a wel-
fare board termination hearing. The attorney knows that the
information in a welfare recipient's file is generally available to
the recipient. In preparation for the hearing, therefore, the at-
torney, as the recipient's legal representative, contacts an eligibil-
ity technician at the welfare department to obtain information
on the agency's reasons for terminating assistance. While the
attorney's conduct is not particularly unusual, it may violate Dis-
ciplinary Rule (DR) 7-104 of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility.1
DR 7-104 prohibits a lawyer "during the course of his repre-
sentation of a client" from communicating "on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a law-
yer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.'2
1. The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association (ABA) was promulgated in 1969 after an extensive effort by
the Bar to revise and reorganize the Canons of Professional Ethics en-
acted in 1908. It has been formally adopted in whole or in part by
statute or by the state's highest court in all 50 states and the District
of Columbia. See A. KAUFmAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBIL-
iTY 29 (1976). The Code consists of three interrelated parts: Canons,
Ethical Considerations (EC's), and Disciplinary Rules (DR's). The
Canons are broad "axiomatic norms" that express the standards that
attorneys should follow in their dealings with the public, the legal sys-
tem, and other members of the bar. Each of the nine Canons is followed
by specific Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. While the
Ethical Considerations are "aspirational" in character, the Disciplinary
Rules are "mandatory," stating precepts intended to bind all attorneys.
See ABA CODE OF PROFESsIoNAL REsioNsIBmIuTY, Preamble and Prelim-
inary Statement. The extent to which the rules are considered binding
or merely advisory may vary among jurisdictions. Compare People v.
McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 173 N.E. 827 (1930) with In re Annunziato's
Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1951).
2. The rule, entitled "Communicating with One of Adverse Inter-
est," in its entirety provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the sub-ject of the representation with a party he knows to be repre-
sented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior con-
sent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized
by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer,
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Although the rule has been uniformly followed when the party
contacted is a private individual,3 its application to contact with
a government entity is somewhat unclear. Two aspects of the
rule pose particular problems. First, the Code does not indicate
which employees of a government body are to be considered the
government "party" for purposes of DR 7-104. Second, it does
not specify at what point in a dispute the government's interests
will be considered sufficiently adverse 4 to those of a member of
the public to trigger the rule's application. This uncertainty is
heightened by the fact that neither the American Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Professional Ethics 5 nor many state bar asso-
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict
with the interests of his client.
3. The rule's prohibitions do not apply when an attorney has re-
ceived permission from the opposing party's counsel or when the contact
is "authorized by law." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILIY DR
7-104; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. I517 (1962)
(Informal Opinion). Interpretations of how the rule applies to private
corporations, rather than private individuals, vary. See notes 38-43 and
accompanying text infra.
4. Fdr a discussion of the requirement of adverseness, see text ac-
companying notes 74-76 infra.
5. Although the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association has never interpreted DR 7-104 in the context of commu-
nications between a private attorney and government personnel, it had
held that original Canon 9, the predecessor of DR 7-104, applied when a
government attorney sought to communicate with a private party repre-
sented by counsel. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No.
95 (1933) (improper for municipality's attorney to permit police officers
to obtain written statements'from persons having personal injury claims
against the municipality when the attorney knew the claimants to be
represented by counsel).
The Committee on Professional Ethics derives its authority to inter-
pret the Code provisions from a bylaw to the Constitution of the Ameri-
can Bar Association that permits the Committee "when consulted by any
member of the bar or by any officer or committee of a state or local bar
association, to express its opinion concerning proper professional or judi-
cial conduct .... ." Opinions issued by the Committee may be either
formal or informal. Formal Opinions are those interpretations of the
Code that the Committee believes to be of broad, general interest. Infor-
mal Opinions resolve questions that arise less frequently and are more
narrow in scope.
Disagreement exists about whether interpretations of the Code by ei-
ther the ABA Committee or by state or local bar associations are binding
or merely advisory. See Kurland, Results of Professional Ethics Ques-
tionnaire Conducted by Connecticut Bar Association, 5 NAT'L AM. B. Ex-
ECUTIVEs NEws 1, 2 (Apr. 1966). Although some bar associations contend
that their opinions are binding on their members, the courts have the ul-
timate authority to interpret the Code. See 0. MARu & R. CLOUGH, Di-
GEST OF BAR AssocIATIoN ETHIcS OPINIONS 2 (1970). The opinions, how-
ever, are generally accorded considerable weight by members of the
bench and bar. Id.
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ciations6 have yet interpreted the rule in a situation involving
a government "party."
In order to determine whether, or to what extent, DR 7-104
should govern contact by an attorney with a government "party,"
this Note will first examine the rationale underlying the rule.
It will next identify which employees of a multi-person entity7
should be considered "parties" under DR 7-104. Based on this
analysis, it will then suggest why and how the rule's application
should be modified when the multi-person entity is a government
body. Finally, the Note will suggest a method to determine at
what point before or during a controversy the government should
be able to invoke the rule's protection.
I. THE RULE'S RATIONALE
In an early opinion the ABA Committee on Professional Eth-
ics identified as two objectives underlying Canon 9,8 the predeces-
6. The texts of state and local ethics opinions are only published,
if at all, in the official publications of each bar association. The formal
opinions issued by state and local organizations through 1970, however,
are summarized in the two volume Digest of Bar Association Ethics
Opinions, see 0. Maru & R. Clough supra note 5; 0. Maru, 1970 SUPPLE-
MENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS (1972), pub-
lished by the American Bar Foundation.
To research this Note, letters were sent to the state bar associations
of 48 states and to the bar associations of the District of Columbia, Chi-
cago, and New York City, asking each bar if it had considered whether
DR 7-104 applied when an attorney representing a private party com-
municated concerning a matter in dispute with a government official or
employee. Of the 51 bar associations contacted, 46 responded. Seven
indicated that they had issued formal opinions interpreting DR 7-104, or
its predecessor, original Canon 9, in this context. Some of these opinions
are discussed in notes 39, 66, 70, & 78, and text accompanying notes 62-66
infra. Three other states had issued informal opinions on this subject,
and one state had touched upon DR 7-104 tangentially in an opinion
concerning another provision of the Code. California's statutory version
of the rule expressly excludes government entities from its coverage.
See notes 60-61 and accompanying text infra. The remaining 34 bar
associations had never considered the rule in a government context.
7. "Multi-person entity" is used in this Note to designate those
judicial entities, such as corporations and government agencies, in which
the authority to act for the entity is typically dispersed among a number
of individuals. Partnerships might also fall within this class, although in
the case of partnerships it is considerably easier to identify the source of
authority because, by definition, partners have authority to act for and
bind the partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1).
8. Original Canon 9 provided:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject
of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent
1977] DR 7-104 1009
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sor to DR 7-104, "preserv [ing] the proper functioning of the legal
profession," and "shield[ing] the adverse party from improper
approaches." 9 With respect to the first of these objectives, the
Committee noted:
Compensation for his services is an attorney's professional right
and, in matters affecting a professional right, candor and fairness
require that other attorneys grant him more than the mere com-
pliance with rules of court or with his statutory rights. They
require that he be given a reasonable opportunity to assert and
protect any such right which he may claim and possess, whether
it be based on a lien or not.'0
This somewhat obscure language suggests that lurking behind
the rule was the belief that if an attorney were present during
an opposing attorney's communication with his client, opposing
counsel could not negotiate an unfavorable settlement that would
jeopardize the attorney's right to recover a contingent fee. An-
other concern underlying the rule may have been the fear that
a lawyer could seize upon the absence of an opposing party's at-
torney to advise that party to retain new counsel, thus depriving
the attorney not only of his fee but of his client as well."
The self-serving aspect of DR 7-104 has not been emphasized
in recent years. The rule's second objective, however, has re-
ceived continuing attention. In disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys, several courts noted the protection original Canon 9
afforded a party during communications with opposing counsel.
In In re Atwell, 2 a Missouri court stated that the Canon existed
"to prohibit lawyers from taking advantage of litigants who are
represented by Counsel.""3 In Mitton v. State Bar,'4 the Cali-
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may
tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he
should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 9.
9. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 108 (1934).
10. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 17 (1930),
quoted in ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 124
(1934).
11. Drinker, whose treatise on legal ethics is cited with approval in
the Preface to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, indicates
that one of the general obligations of a lawyer is not to steal another
lawyer's clients. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETncS 190 (1953). Canon 7 of the
original Canons of Ethics expressed a similar concern: "[E] fforts, direct
or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer, are unworthy of those who should be brethren at the Bar
.... " ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 7.
12. 232 Mo. App. 186, 115 S.W.2d 527 (1938).
13. Id. at 188, 115 S.W.2d at 528.
14. 71 Cal. 2d 525, 455 P.2d 753, 78 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1969). The attor-
ney in Mitton had communicated directly with an opposing party con-
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fornia Supreme Court offered a more explicit description of the
dangers against which the rule was directed:
The rule was designed to permit an attorney to function ade-
quately in his proper role and to prevent the opposing attorney
from impeding his performance in such role. If a party's counsel
is present when an opposing attorney communicates with a party,
counsel can easily correct any element of error in the commu-
nication or correct the effect of the communication by calling
attention to counteracting elements which may exist.' 5
Another aspect of the rule, subsequently recognized by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Abeles v. State Bar,'6 was the safeguard
it provided against the risk that a party without benefit of coun-
sel would unwittingly make statements to opposing counsel that
could prejudice the party's interests at trial.17
That benefits are to be derived from the retention of counsel
and his active involvement in all phases of litigation is an as-
sumption that pervades the entire legal system, both criminal
and civil. In the context of criminal proceedings, it is reflected
in the development of a constitutional right to counsel. 18 This
right derives from a conviction that the adversary system of jus-
tice successfully promotes due process only when both sides have
cerning both the party's opposition to a motion for a new trial and the
possibility of judgment in excess of the policy limits of the party's auto-
mobile liability insurance. Since both of these matters might have af-
fected the resolution of the dispute, it was held that the party contacted
needed the benefit of counsel to evaluate the accuracy of the communica-
tions.
15. Id. at 534, 455 P.2d at 758, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
16. 9 Cal. 3d 603, 510 P.2d 7l9, 108 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1973).
17. The basis of the disciplinary action in Abeles was unauthorized
contact by an attorney with one of several business partners who were
joint parties to a lawsuit against the attorney's client. The attorney had
persuaded one of the opposing parties, out of the presence of counsel, to
sign an affidavit denying that he authorized the filing of the action and
repudiating various allegations in the complaint. Even though there was
counsel of record for the business enterprise, the accused attorney as-
serted that the party with whom he had communicated was not repre-
sented by that counsel. The California Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, ruling that when there was counsel of record, communication
should be through him, whether or not he was, in fact, authorized to act
for the party. Id. at 609-10, 510 P.2d at 723, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
18. The scope of the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding has
been delineated in a long series of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300 (1973) (right to counsel exists at any stage in which the ac-
cused is subject to confrontation by the prosecution); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel exists at time of arraignment
or preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(right to counsel extends to post-indictment line-up). But see Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right to counsel at pre-indictment
identifications). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right
to counsel exists during custodial interrogation).
19771
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equal ability to develop and argue the merits of a case.19 The
Supreme Court, in Powell v. Alabama,20 recognized that a private
individual, not trained in the intricacies of the law, is simply
no match for a skilled attorney, making it imperative that a de-
fendant generally have the same access to counsel as the state.
21
Miranda v. Arizona 2 1 recognized the importance of counsel at
these pretrial confrontations when counsel's presence would not
only reduce the likelihood that the state would apply undue
pressure but would also guarantee that the party being inter-
rogated gave a "fully accurate statement" that would be "rightly
reported by the prosecution at trial. '23  Similar concerns apply
to parties involved in civil litigation. In Goldberg v. Kelly,
24
for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged the potential
importance of counsel to safeguard a welfare recipient's due
process rights during a pre-termination hearing.
25
The importance of the protective function served by counsel
is also reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Al-
though the Code does not purport to require that all parties be
afforded counsel, the same considerations of fairness that under-
lie the concept of due process suggest that if a party does have
a lawyer, that lawyer should be present during questioning of his
client by an opposing attorney. DR 7-104 reflects an apparent
conviction that, in the interests of legal sportsmanship, a party
should not be allowed to further his case by taking advantage of
his opponent's nalvet6 to elicit devastating statements or to con-
clude an ill-advised settlement. The legal system, accordingly,
protects a party against himself by ensuring that contacts with
opposing attorneys will take place only through the party's own
counsel or in his presence.
The attorney can protect his client in dealing with an oppos-
ing attorney in a number of ways. For example, a party is under
no legal obligation to disclose information unless the opponent
19. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 69. In a dissent to Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
211 (1963), Justice White described original Canon 9 as forbidding law-
yers "to interview the opposing party because of the supposed imbalance
of legal skill and acumen between the lawyer and the party litigant,"
language similar to that used in Powell.
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Id. at 470.
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. Id. at 270-71 ("Counsel can help delineate the issues, present
the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination,
and generally safeguard the interests of [his client].").
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formally requests discovery. Acting without benefit of counsel,
however, he might be unaware of his right to withhold informa-
tion and make prejudicial disclosures under pressure from an
aggressive attorney.26 In cases where a party decides to expedite
the resolution of a dispute by voluntarily responding to opposing
counsel's questions, counsel also has an important function to
perform. He can object, on behalf of his client, to questions re-
questing information subject to a claim of privilege, 27 or he can
stress the need for strict accuracy and encourage his client to
refresh his memory by checking past records if a key fact or date
is at issue. When damaging or prejudicial statements are made
during the course of an interview, the attorney can minimize the
harm done to his client's case by ensuring that such statements
are, to the extent possible, explained or clarified, either during
the interview itself or at trial.2 Finally, counsel can ensure
that the opposing attorney does not give inaccurate advice and
that the client does not unwisely settle or compromise his case.
I. THE GOVERNMENT PARTY
A. DEFINING THE PARTY IN MULTI-PERSON ENTITIES
The protective function served by counsel's presence reflects
the concept of fair play that lies at the heart of the adversary
system. When the party is a multi-person entity, such as a cor-
poration or a government body, however, DR 7-104's protection
of parties may be at odds with the goal of permitting access to
witnesses in order to uncover and present all relevant evidence
to the trier of facts.
That our legal system affords attorneys relative freedom to
interview witnesses-as opposed to parties-was recognized by
former Canon 39 which provided that "[a] lawyer may properly
26. The adversary process itself provides a partial check against the
likelihood that an attorney will harass an opposing party into making
inaccurate or careless statements, for the attorney gains little if the
statements he elicits can be easily discredited at trial. Accordingly, the
attorney has some incentive to take care to impress upon the party being
interviewed the need for accuracy in his remarks. Since the interests of
the attorney and the interviewee conflict, however, the interviewing at-
torney could hardly undertake to advise the party fully; DR 7-104 thus
provides the additional protection of the party's own counsel.
27. For a discussion of privileges, see generally C. MCCORMACK,
EVIDENCE §§ 72-183 (2d ed. 1972). See also note 50 infra.
28. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966) ("The presence
of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly re-
ported by the prosecutor at trial.").
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interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing
side in any civil suit or criminal action without the consent of op-
posing counsel or party.12 0 The only restriction placed on the con-
tacting attorney was that he "scrupulously avoid any suggestion
calculated to induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the
truth, or in any degree to affect his free and untrammeled con-
duct when appearing at the trial or on the witness stand."3 0 Al-
though the new Code of Professional Responsibility did not
retain Canon 39 as a separate provision, it does distinguish be-
tween party and witness,3 1 placing greater restrictions on contact
with the former. This distinction is important in determining
the scope of DR 7-104's application to the multi-person entity, for
a fair interpretation of the rule should accommodate both the
attorney's need for relative freedom in interviewing witnesses
and the need for restraints on communicating with a party.
Both government and corporate entities will probably have
exclusive possession of much of the information necessary for
trial preparation, and the statements of employees are likely to
be essential to the opposing party's case. Thus, if the adversarial
process is to function effectively, it is imperative that DR 7-104
not significantly impair opposing counsel's ability to gather evi-
dence. When the party sought to be contacted is a private indi-
vidual, DR 7-104 prevents an attorney from interviewing only
that individual; but where the party is a multi-person entity,
the rule could be broadly read to encompass virtually any em-
ployee, thus shielding a potentially large number of important
witnesses.3 2
29. ABA CANONS or PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs No. 39 (as amended
1937). Prior to 1937, Canon 39 read as follows:
Compensation demanded or received by any witness in ex-
cess of statutory allowances should be disclosed to the court and
adverse counsel.
If the ascertainment of truth requires that a lawyer should
seek information from one connected with or reputed to be
biased in favor of an adverse party, he is not thereby deterred
from seeking to ascertain the truth from such person in the in-
terest of his client.
Reprinted in AmERIcAN BAR AssocIATION, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETH-
ics 176 (1967).
30. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 39.
31. For the Code's current restrictions on dealing with witnesses, see
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY EC 7-28, DR 7-102 (A) (3)-
(7), DR 7-109 (c).
32. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has ruled that when
an individual is both a party and a potential witness, he should be
treated as a party. See ABA Commw. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
No. 187 (1938). Thus if employees were considered parties, as well as
witnesses, the restrictions of DR 7-104 would apply.
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If the rule were broadly applied, gathering evidence could
be made particularly difficult: an entity could simply refuse
requests by opposing counsel to communicate directly with em-
ployees. Although counsel could engage in discovery,33 using
depositions, for example, as a "substitute" for informal inter-
views, discovery tends to be costly. When the "party" is a multi-
person entity, the cost is potentially much greater than in the
case of an individual since opposing counsel might be forced to
question many employees to determine whether their testimony
would be helpful to his case. If the entity permitted inter-
views with its employees, but insisted that its attorney be present
during questioning, costly delays would undoubtedly result, if
only from the difficulty of arranging mutually convenient times
for both parties' attorneys to be present. Whether such a policy
would significantly impede trial preparation would depend large-
ly upon how many employees fell within the proscription of
DR 7-104 and on the entity's degree of cooperation with its op-
ponent.
Even if the entity were relatively cooperative and permitted
interviews with its attorney present, opposing counsel's oppor-
tunity to gather information freely could be impaired. The
presence of the entity's attorney might tend to stifle the employ-
ee's willingness to disclose information. Although government
or corporate employees may have less commitment to the en-
tity's practices and policies than their superiors and may often
be more willing to speak candidly about internal operations,34
33. The general discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are broad, providing that
[p] arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action .... It is not ground for objection that the in-
formation sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the informa-
tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1). See FED. R. Crv. P. 27-32 (depositions); FED. R.
Crv. P. 33 (interrogatories).
34. John Kenneth Galbraith suggests that lower level corporate
employees in general identify less with the corporation than do top
management officials. J. GALnBRATH, TnE NE W INDUSTRIAL STATE 149-53
(1967). The degree to which employees identify with the corporation
may vary, however, depending on factors such as: (a) the prestige of
the group of the organization attracting identification, (b) the extent to
which individuals who comprise the organization interact, (c) the level
of satisfaction of the needs of individuals within the organization, and
(d) the degree to which inner competition is minimized. Id. at 153.
Although developed in a corporate context, these generalizations appear
applicable to government employees as well.
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the presence of the entity's attorney during questioning could
discourage an employee from such disclosures for fear that if
his statements were reported to his superior, it would jeopar-
dize his job or the possibility of advancement. 35
Although the suggested problems in information gathering
are not insurmountable-the use of discovery or skillful question-
ing by an attorney with the entity's attorney present could even-
tually produce information helpful to the client's case-trial
preparation would be facilitated if DR 7-104 were read narrowly
enough to exclude some employees from the category of
"party."36 At the same time, however, it is important to preserve
35. That counsel for a multi-person entity would want to be present
precisely because his presence might inhibit unfavorable remarks is con-
sistent with expectations about the operation of an adversary system. By
adopting DR 7-104, the legal profession has suggested that parties de-
serve protection against the risk of volunteering adverse information de-
spite the problems created for the opposing party in his search for infor-
mation valuable to his case. But the adversary system is also designed
to achieve a fair result; that goal is more seriously impeded by extending
the rule to a large group of employees of a multi-person entity than by
applying the rule to private individuals.
36. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has narrowed the
rule to exclude some employees. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 117 (1934). But cf. NEW YORK COUNTY BAR Ass'N, OPIN-
IONS, No. 528 (1965) (improper for plaintiff's attorney to communicate
directly with any employee of defendant corporation).
The Committee held in Opinion 117 that the attorney for a person
injured by falling on the slippery floor of a store could properly inter-
view the clerks employed by the store who had witnessed the accident.
Although it is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the defendant
party was a sole proprietor or a corporation, the opinion has been inter-
preted by other bar associations as establishing a standard for corporate
situations. See, e.g., Los ANGELES BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS, No. 234 (1956).
See also MICHIGAN BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS, No. 41 (1951), reprinted in 38
MIcH. ST. B.J. 181 (1959) (permissible to interview defendant corpora-
tion's clerks who had witnessed or were involved in accident causing in-
jury without obtaining consent of opposing counsel).
In Opinion 117, the ABA Committee permitted communication with
employees when the primary purpose of the contact was to gather infor-
mation for trial preparation. While the Committee did not indicate spe-
cifically that the purpose for the contact was important to its decisions,
a purpose test might be used to determine whether the rule applied. Un-
der this test, contact with an employee to establish facts needed for liti-
gation would be permitted, but contact to negotiate settlement of a claim
would not. Given the difficulties of predicting the exact direction a con-
versation with an officer of a corporation or government agency might
take, however, it would be awkward to impose such a restriction on at-
torneys. Furthermore, in another context the ABA later rejected this
distinction between permitted and unpermitted contacts. "[I]t is clear
from the earlier opinions of this committee that Canon 9 . . .does not
allow a communication with an opposing party, without the consent of
his counsel, though the purpose merely be to investigate the facts. Opin-
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the general purpose of DR 7-104 to protect a party from un-
wittingly saying or doing anything that might prejudice his inter-
ests. To ensure that both parties to a dispute are optimally pro-
tected, only those employees of the multi-person entity whose
interests are so closely bound up with the entity's interests that
they can be equated with one another should be considered po-
tential "parties"; all other employees should be merely witnesses.
Those who are ultimately responsible for managing the en-
tity's operations have the strongest interest in the outcome of
any dispute involving the entity. Because they set policy, they
will be held accountable if the entity is found to have been in
the wrong. These officials are the multi-person entity's alter ego
-they can speak and act for the entity and can settle controver-
sies on its behalf. This Note will suggest that, for reasons pecu-
liar to the government, the "party" label be restricted to a sub-
class of those individuals within a government entity who have
executive management responsibilities. 7 For the moment, how-
ever, it is enough to note that the "party" designation for multi-
person entities in general should extend no further than execu-
tive officers.38 Bar associations that have interpreted DR 7-104
in the context of a multi-person entity have generally adopted
this approach.3 9
ions 117, 95, 66." ABA Comm. ON PROFEsSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONs, No.
187 (1938). The local bar associations have agreed with the ABA that
the purpose for which contact is sought should not determine whether
the rule applies. See, e.g., ALASKA BAR ASS'N, OPINIoNs, No. 71-1
(1971). See also DRiNKER, supra note 11, at 201-03.
37. See text accompanying notes 44-72 infra.
38. When an employee's actions subject him to the possibility of
personal liability, of course, he should be treated like any other party or
prospective party.
39. See ARIZONA BAR Ass'N, OPINIONs, No. 203 (1966) (counsel rep-
resenting a claimant against a municipality could, if he informed the em-
ployees of his role in the case, contact nonadministrative municipal em-
ployees without permission from the municipality's counsel but not em-
ployees who held positions that allowed them to "speak for and to bind"
the municipality); IDAHO BAR Ass'N, OPInONs, No. 21 (1960) (counsel
for plaintiff could interview employees of defendant corporation without
the presence of counsel but not its officers or directors who were the cor-
poration's "alter ego").
In 1971, the New Mexico Bar Association held, in a case involving lit-
igation against the state highway department, that DR 7-104 prevented
direct communication with the highway commissioner, state highway en-
gineer, and other executive nonlegal personnel. While the language of
DR 7-104 stipulates that the contacting attorney must obtain the consent
of counsel before engaging in communication with an opposing party, the
New Mexico Bar held it sufficient if the attorney merely notified oppos-
ing counsel of the intended contact. NEw MExIco BAR Ass'N, OPNIONS,
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The Texas Bar, however, has read the rule more broadly,
stating that, in a corporate context, an attorney is precluded from
communicating with either officers or directors of the corporation
or any employee whose acts or omissions are the subject of con-
troversy and for which the corporation may be liable.40 In cer-
tain respects, this opinion is consistent with the general goals
of DR 7-104. Precluding direct communication with corporate
officers and directors protects the class of individuals who may
be able to bind the corporation to the terms of a settlement; pre-
venting direct contact with employees whose actions are the sub-
ject of litigation insulates individuals whose statements are likely
to be crucial to the corporation's case.
An early ABA ethics opinion, however, suggests that
whether an employee is a "party" should not turn on the fact
that he could damage an entity's interests. In Opinion 117, 41
the Ethics Committee approved direct communication by an at-
torney with employees who had witnessed an accident and whose
statements were potentially harmful to their employer's case.42
This position seems sound, for unless the employee is subject to
personal liability, his interest in the dispute is not closely identi-
fied with that of the entity, and he will not be accountable to
persons outside the entity for his actions. Executive officers, on
the other hand, must account for the entity's actions. Conse-
quently, construing DR 7-104 to include only these officials would
achieve fair results.43
That this narrow definition is preferable to that of the Texas
Bar opinion can be illustrated by comparing the applicability of
reprinted in 9 ST. B. N.M. BULL. 391 (1971), summarized in O. MARU, su-
pra note 6, at 244.
40. TExAs BAR ASS'N, OPINIONs, No. 342 (1968).
41. ABA CoMm. oN PROFESSIONAL ETIcs, OPiNoNs, No. 117 (1934).
42. Id. A number of state and local bar associations also permit an
attorney to interview employees of the opposing party, even when the
actions of the employees are the subject of dispute. See Los ANGELES
BAR Ass'WN, OPINIoNs, No. 234, reprinted in 31 L.A. B. BULL. 267(1956) (an attorney could interview, without consent of defendant's
counsel, both the agent who wrote the insurance policy in issue and an
underwriter employed by defendant insurance corporation); NEw Yoax
Cirr BAR AsS'N, OPI -ONs, No. 331 (1935) (plaintiff's lawyer could inter-
view an employee of a prospective defendant without consent of defend-
ant's counsel despite the fact that the suit was a negligence action and
the employee interviewed was allegedly neglegent); NORTH CAno-
LINA BAR ASS'WN, OPIIONS, No. 97 (1952) (plaintiff's attorney could in-
terview, without consent of defendant's counsel, a corporate employee
whose actions were the basis of a lawsuit against the corporation but who
was not himself a party).
43. To suggest that the corporate or government "party" should be
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the rule to a multi-person entity and to a sole proprietorship.
In litigation involving a sole proprietor, the "party" label would
extend only to the individual owner of the business and not to
his employees. Although defining "party" as "executive officers"
necessarily means that more individuals in a multi-person entity
will be protected than in a sole proprietorship, the "executive"
definition minimizes disparities in the rule's application by ensur-
ing that only those who hold positions functionally similar to
that of a sole proprietor will be shielded. The Texas position,
in contrast, shields employees who may have no responsibility
for the entity's actions. This extends far more protection to the
multi-person entity than to the sole proprietorship, an unfair re-
sult that seems based only on the entity's legal form, rather than
on an analysis of the interests that DR 7-104 should be designed
to accommodate.
B. DEFINING THE GOVERNMENT PARTY
Although the considerations generally applicable to any
multi-person entity are helpful in determining the extent to
which DR 7-104 should protect access to mere witnesses and
shield those who should be considered parties, where the multi-
person entity is the government, other considerations may also
affect how the rule should be interpreted and applied. In many
respects, the government entity has interests identical to those
of the corporate party; it has an interest in presenting its case
defined to include executive level officials rather than all employees im-
plies that a sharp distinction can be made between those individuals with
executive responsibilities and all other individuals within an organiza-
tion. In reality, the distinction is often blurred. Officers and directors
of a corporation, for example, are obviously within the executive cate-
gory, but it is far less clear how middle management personnel should be
classified. If the executive label is to encompass all those responsible for
corporate policy, middle management employees would seem to qualify.
Yet, many of the bar associations that have considered DR 7-104 in the
context of a multi-person entity seem to regard the executive classifica-
tion as synonymous with officers and directors. See, e.g., IDAHO BAR
Ass'N, OPiNroNs, No. 21 (1960), discussed at note 39 supra. Perhaps that
position results from the certainty it affords both bar disciplinary com-
mittees and attorneys in deciding whether specific conduct complies with
DR 7-104. To include within the rule those middle management em-
ployees responsible in some part for a specific policy would require at-
torneys to know the intricacies of each entity's decisionmaking process
since the responsibility entrusted to middle management personnel is apt
to vary greatly from one organization to another. Therefore, it is con-
venient to limit the rule's application to top executive officials on the as-
sumption that officers and directors are responsible for the entity's pol-
icy.
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effectively and persuasively and in ensuring that the terms
of any settlement are favorable.4 4 Unlike the corporate party,
however, the government also has an obligation to advance the
public's interest in achieving justice, an obligation that outweighs
its narrower interest in winning a lawsuit. This ultimate obliga-
tion to serve the public distinguishes the government from the
corporate party4 5 and, as will be demonstrated, is the reason that,
for purposes of DR 7-104, the "party" label should be more nar-
rowly construed when applied to contact with government em-
ployees.
The Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes that the
promotion of justice is a paramount responsibility of the govern-
ment: "a government lawyer in a civil action or administrative
proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop
a full and fair record, and he should not use his position . ..
to bring about unjust settlements or results.' ' 46  Similarly, in
the interest of justice, the Code 47 and the courts48 require public
prosecutors to disclose information within their knowledge that
might be favorable to the defendant.
Although a private party's interest in winning a lawsuit is
permitted to conflict with society's interests in promoting justice,
a government party's stake in winning is superseded by its re-
44. Indeed, for most litigation purposes, the law treats a govern-
ment party just like any other party. The government, for example, has
the right to assert the attorney-client privilege to protect certain types
of information from disclosure, see Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D.
Wash. 1975), and is subject to the same rules of discovery as other par-
ties, see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958);
Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TicE 26.61 (2), at 263 (2d ed. 1976).
45. The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Federal Bar As-
sociation expressed the government's obligation to the public in dis-
cussing a government attorney's responsibilities:
This lawyer assumes a public trust, for the government, over-all
and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our de-
mocracy with its representative form of government. Each part
of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the
public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent
with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations.
In contrast, the private practitioner represents the client's per-
sonal or private interest.
FEDERAL BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS, No. 73-1, reprinted in 32 FED. B.J. 71
(1973).
46. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14.
47. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13.
48. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal
Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
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sponsibility to seek a fair result.49 Thus, when a member of the
public has been wronged by some action or inaction of a govern-
ment agent, the government's proper goal coincides with that of
the injured citizen in uncovering and correcting the wrong. To
the extent that statements made by government employees reveal
information that helps the trier of fact to ascertain "the truth,"
the government is not prejudiced and, therefore, has no reason
to invoke DR 7-104 as a check against what its employees may
tell an opposing attorney.50 Indeed, since the presence of counsel
may discourage employees from candidly expressing their views,
49. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("[I]t is now firmly established that whether or not a
private employer is free to act capriciously or unreasonably in respect
to employment practices .... a government employer is different. The
government may only act fairly and reasonably.") (emphasis added).
50. The disclosure of government information could be damaging
for reasons other than its potential to undermine the government's posi-
tion in litigation. Disclosure of privileged information, for example, may
have a detrimental effect on the government's ability to execute its ad-
ministrative responsibilities. Common law evidentiary privileges en-
shroud both military and state secrets and the identity of government in-
formers. 8 J. WIGMOIORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2374, 2378 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). Congress has also enacted statutes to protect certain government
communications and reports from public scrutiny. Id. If a private attor-
ney is allowed to communicate directly with government employees,
however, he might persuade them to release confidential information
helpful to his client's case. If the government's attorney were contacted
instead, he could discourage any unauthorized release of privileged in-
formation. But if this is the rationale which justifies requiring a govern-
ment attorney to be present during an interview with a government em-
ployee, then individuals other than attorneys-for example, news report-
ers-should also be barred from contacting government employees di-
rectly since the dangers of unauthorized disclosures would be equally
great. In any event, since the government is capable of policing its own
employees, there is no apparent reason for the ethical code of the legal
profession to address this issue.
If a government employee's release of information to a private attor-
ney were to waive the government's right to claim a privilege at trial,
the legal profession might properly be concerned with disciplining the at-
torney. It is unlikely, however, that disclosure of information by anyone
other than the head of an agency would be a valid waiver of the govern-
ment's right subsequently to assert a claim of privilege. In the context
of state and military secrets, the courts have held that only an agency
or department head can claim the privilege on behalf of the government
at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)
("There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal con-
sideration by that officer.") (footnotes omitted). Conversely, it is logical
to infer that only a department or agency head can waive the privilege.
Since such an official probably could not be pressured into disclosing
privileged information during a conversation with opposing counsel, the
danger that privileges would be forfeited by permitting attorney con-
tact with government employees seems slight.
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application of the rule could actually undermine the govern-
ment's interest in achieving justice.
At the same time, however, the absence of government coun-
sel during the opposing attorney's interrogation of its employees
may impede the pursuit of truth. An aggressive attorney may
elicit from the employee information damaging to the govern-
ment's case without making him aware of the need to ensure
its accuracy. The likelihood that a government employee will
be careless in his remarks could be minimized somewhat by re-
quiring, as did former Canon 39, that the contacting attorney
disclose both his identity and that he represents a party opponent
before questioning any government employee. 51 Although the
language of Canon 39 has been dropped from the new Code of
Professional Responsibility, the disclosure requirement seems
consistent with a lawyer's general obligation as an officer of the
court not to mislead or deceive parties or witnesses.52
This safeguard, however, will not completely eliminate the
risk that an overreaching attorney may pressure a government
employee into making a distorted or misleading statement that
can be used against the government at trial. Thus, a narrow
construction of "party" for purposes of DR 7-104 may increase
the likelihood that the government will be forced to rebut damag-
ing assertions obtained from its employees under pressure, mak-
ing the government attorney's task at trial more difficult.
Despite this possibility, a narrow construction of the rule
remains desirable.53 rn addition to the government's responsi-
51. In interpreting Canon 39, the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics held: "An attorney for the plaintiff may properly interview em-
ployees of the defendant who were witnesses to the incident upon which
the suit is based so long as no deception is practiced and the employees
are informed that the person interviewing them is the attorney for the
plaintiff." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 117
(1934). For partial text of Canon 39, see the text accompanying notes
29-30 supra.
52. DR 1-102(A) (4) provides that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (A) (4).
53. The federal government has urged on occasion that DR 7-104
not be allowed to frustrate investigations designed to expose government
wrongdoing. In Jenkins v. Cowley, C.A. No. 3-74-394-C (N.D. Tex.
1974), the defendants alleged that the government had violated the rule
by communicating directly with certain employees during an investiga-
tion of possible criminal violations of the Civil Rights Acts. The govern-
ment subsequently submitted information gathered during that investi-
gation to the court in a civil action brought against the defendants. The
Justice Department defended its conduct, arguing that the exception in
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bility to promote public justice rather than its narrow self-in-
terest, the government is further distinguished from a private
party by its responsibility-wholly apart from its role in litiga-
tion-to supply information concerning government operations
to the public5 4 and to be responsive to the public's views on how
the government should operate. DR 7-104's tendency to inhibit
access and restrict disclosure runs counter to these other govern-
ment obligations.
The benefits of maintaining open lines of communication be-
tween the public and the government are considerable. Public
input into the government's decisionmaking is essential to ensure,
for example, that government policies reflect the public's will.55
Yet, if a citizen attempts to communicate through his attorney
about a dispute, a broad reading of DR 7-104 might subject the
attorney to discipline for contacting directly a represented party.
DR 7-104 for direct communication with a party when "authorized by
law" covers contacts made by the Justice Department with state employ-
ees in the course of civil rights investigations, since such investigations
are authorized by law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1970) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970). Response Brief of the United States to a Motion to Dis-
miss the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Jenkins v. Cowley, C.A.
No. 3-74-394-C (N.D. Tex. 1974). The government also argued that as
amicus curiae it was not adverse to the defendants or any other party,
nor was it representing a "client" within the terms of the disciplinary
rule. Id. at 5. The court in Jenkins found no unethical behavior and de-
nied the defendant's motion to dismiss. See letter from Marie Klimesz,
Attorney, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to author (Apr. 28,
1977) (on file with MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW).
It is not at all clear that the drafters of the Code intended to exclude
from DR 7-104 investigations authorized by statutes such as the Civil
Rights Acts. Rather, the drafters probably inserted the excektion for
contacts "authorized by law" to exclude contacts connected with discov-
ery proceedings, such as the taking of depositions. See J.M. CLARK &
C. WOLFRAM, PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILIT-L: IsSUES FOR MMESOTA AT-
ToRNEYs 726 (1974). Since the federal government has indicated its be-
lief that the rule should not apply to its own investigations, however, it
would be anomalous for it to contend that the rule should be broadly
construed when a private party seeks to discover information concerning
the government's wrongdoing by contacting its employees.
54. The recent impetus toward greater openness in government is
reflected in passage of legislation such as the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). During Senate debate on the Act, Senator
Moss, one of its sponsors, expressed the philosophy underlying the Act
as the need to "remove every barrier to information about-and under-
standing of-Government activities consistent with our security [so] the
American public is ... adequately equipped to fulfill the ever more de-
manding role of responsible citizenship.' 112 CONG. REC. 13641 (1966).
55. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
See generally E. REDFORD, DEnVocRAcY IN THE ADINISTRATIVE STATE 139-42
(1969).
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The government's attorney would have to be consulted instead,
and although this would not cut off the citizen's access to his
government, the use of an extra intermediary would make com-
munication considerably more difficult and less effective. 56
The public must also have extensive access to government
information. One commentator has termed an informed public
"the best 'inspector general' any central government ever
had,"5 7 who, if given enough information about government
transactions to detect improper conduct, will protect the govern-
ment against "the misfeasance or malfeasance of its own admin-
istrators."5 8 The government's knowledge that the public has
access to information encourages responsible decisionmaking
since the government will want to avoid situations that could
prove embarrassing if revealed. Moreover, government errors,
once discovered, can be remedied by resort to the courts.59 Be-
cause a broad reading of DR 7-104 would restrict a citizen's access
to the very information that would expose government error, the
rule's scope in a government setting should be severely limited.
Concern with curbing DR 7-104's restraints in a government
context is reflected in the positions taken by two of the bar asso-
ciations that have addressed the issue in any detail. The Califor-
nia equivalent of DR 7-104 simply states that the rule's prohibi-
tion of direct communication with parties represented by counsel
is inapplicable to "communications with a public officer, board,
committee or body."6 0  Thus, the California Bar seems to have
56. The possibility that something may be lost in translation when
communication is routed through intermediaries appears to have been
the concern underlying a recent opinion by the New York State Bar al-
lowing direct communication with members of a board of education who
had voted in the minority on a contested matter. NEW YoRK STATE BAR
Ass'N, OPINIONS, No. 404 (1975). See text accompanying notes 62-66
infra.
57. J.R. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 73 (1964).
58. Id.
59. A citizen suit against the government might seek injunctive or
declaratory relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2201 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
Alternatively, the suit might seek damages. The ability of the public to
seek damages depends, however, on a waiver by the government of its
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1970); MINN. STAT. §§ 3.732-.84 (1976).
60. Rule 7-103 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar
of California, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6076 (West Supp. 1977). The
California rule in its entirety reads:
A member of the State Bar shall not communicate directly or
indirectly with a party whom he knows to be represented by
counsel upon a subject of controversy, without the express con-
sent of such counsel. This rule shall not apply to communica-
tions with a public officer, board, committee or body.
The California provision was originally promulgated in 1928, pursuant to
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decided that the public's interest in promoting unrestricted access
to government outweighs the government's interest in having
counsel present during interrogation of any of its employees. 61
The New York State Bar has reached a similar result with
respect to communications with certain elected officials. In a
1975 opinion, the New York State Committee on Professional
Ethics stated that an attorney could communicate with individual
minority members of a board of education 62 about a contested
board decision.63
The overriding public interest compels that an opportunity
be afforded to the public and their authorized representatives to
obtain the views of, and pertinent facts from, public officials
representing them. Minority members of a public body should
not, for purposes of DR 7-104(A) (1), be considered adverse
parties to their constituents whom they were selected to repre-
sent.
Thus DR 7-104(A) (1) is read as implicitly creating a lim-
ited exception to its otherwise broad prohibitions because a pub-
authority granted the Board of Governors of the State Bar Association
by the California legislature under CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West
1974). The original rule was retained unchanged in the revised Code of
Ethics adopted by the California Bar and approved by the state supreme
court in 1974.
In recent years, an effort has been made to modify rule 7-103 by re-
stricting the circumstances under which direct communication with gov-
ernment employees is allowed. In February 1977, hearings were held be-
fore the California Board of Governors Committee on Professional Re-
sponsibility to discuss a redraft of the rule. See letter from Ronald
Stovitz, State Bar of California, to author (Mar. 4, 1977) (on file with
M.NNESOTA LAW Rzvixw). As of June 1977, however, a draft proposal
had not yet been prepared.
61. Another plausible explanation for the California rule is that the
California Bar wanted the legislative and executive branches to deter-
mine when, if ever, communication with government officials should be
restricted. Hence, the California drafters may have excepted the govern-
ment from the Code, expecting those branches to formulate their own po-
sitions.
62. In one sense, minority board members are not really adverse
parties at all and perhaps should never be subject to the rule since they
opposed the decision being challenged. See text accompanying notes 74-
76 infra, for discussion of adverseness. More importantly, their interests
may not even be represented in the controversy. Not only will the
board's counsel reflect the position taken by the board majority, but
he might also attempt to prevent an outside attorney from contacting
minority members insofar as they may have information prejudicial to
the board's interests in the case.
63. NEW YORK STATE BAR As'N, OPINIoNs, No. 404 (1975). Be-
cause the facts underlying the opinion are unclear, it is difficult to dis-
cern whether the board was itself in the process of reviewing its earlier
decision, whether the decision was being reviewed by some higher ad-
ministrative body, or whether it was being attacked in court.
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lic body is involved and [the exception] is not intended to
extend beyond such public entities.0 4
It might be argued that this ruling should apply only to contact
with elected officials because they have a greater responsibility
to be accessible to their constituents than nonelected officials
have to the public generally. The New York State Bar opinion,
however, is based on the rationale that members of the public
should be permitted to communicate directly with their represen-
tatives, and this rationale seems applicable to any contact with
a government entity. 5 Thus, following a broad reading of the
New York State opinion, the existing language of DR 7-104 could
be interpreted to be inapplicable to communication with all gov-
ernment entities.66
Making DR 7-104 totally inapplicable to the government, as
California does explicitly and as New York may have done im-
plicitly, strikes the balance between competing values incor-
rectly. The California decision to sacrifice the rule's protection
of a party from damaging statements in order to encourage unre-
stricted public access to all government officials can be justified
as essential to responsive and responsible government. But the
64. Id.
65. A different result would be required when a board was acting
in an adjudicative capacity. The applicable ethical provision in that
situation is DR 7-110, which provides that a lawyer may not discuss the
merits of a case with a judge or an official before whom the proceeding
is pending except: (1) in the course of official proceedings, (2) in writ-
ing but only if a copy of the writing is delivered to opposing counsel,
(3) orally but only upon giving adequate notice to opposing counsel, or
(4) as otherwise provided by law. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
SiBILITy DR 7-110 (B).
The administrative director of the Minnesota State Ethics Panel has
advised that when an agency has both legislative and adjudicative re-
sponsibilities, DR 7-110 is controlling. See letter from R. Walter Bach-
man, Jr., Administrative Director, Minnesota Professional Responsibility
Board, to a member of the Minnesota Public Service Commission (Jan.
25, 1977) (on file with MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW).
66. Opinion 404 is confusing because the New York State Bar cited,
without overruling, an earlier opinion that held DR 7-104 applicable to
governmental entities. NEw YoRx STATE BAR Ass'N, OPINONs, No. 160
(1970). It is unclear whether the Bar in the later opinion intended to
overrule its former position or whether, instead, it simply wanted to per-
mit contact with minority elected board members because of their special
situation.
North Carolina has explicitly allowed direct communication with all
officials and employees of a municipality regardless of whether an action
has been instituted against the municipality. NORTH CAROLINA BAR
Ass'N, OPINiONs, No. 184 (1956). The North Carolina Bar, however, de-
tails neither the facts on which it based its conclusion nor the rationale
for its result.
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California position undermines another major purpose of the
rule: to protect a party from agreeing to unwise settlements.
The public is interested not only in maintaining open communica-
tion with the government but also in ensuring that the govern-
ment does not concede lawsuits it should win. Thus, to protect
the latter interest, DR 7-104 should apply to some contacts with
some government officers.T
In the corporate context, extending the "party" label to top
level executives will probably ensure, in the majority of in-
stances, that those individuals having the authority to conclude
a settlement on behalf of the corporation will be protected under
the rule. This is not true in the case of a government body.
A relatively low ranking government employee, such as a welfare
technician, would be able to "settle" on the government's behalf,
if "settle" is taken to mean "bind the government" to the resolu-
tion of any dispute; a welfare technician, for example, could rein-
state a benefit erroneously denied. Requiring an attorney to con-
tact the government's counsel in situations such as this, however,
would turn the governmental process into an administrative
nightmare. Direct contact with many government employees is
essential to the efficient resolution of the myriad minor dis-
putes between the public and government agencies. Indeed, to
require an attorney to contact a government attorney to discuss
settlements of minor matters could produce the anomalous result
that a represented person would be disadvantaged relative to
someone who had not sought legal assistance at all. An unrep-
resented party would be free to negotiate at will with govern-
ment employees. DR 7-104, however, expressly prohibits an
attorney from "causing" another to communicate directly with a
party he knows to be represented by counsel. 68 The ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics has interpreted this language broad-
ly to prohibit a lawyer not only from instructing his client to
communicate with an opposing party but also from tolerating acts
67. See note 36 supra. Since the major concern is to protect the
government party against unwise settlement, not against harmful dis-
closure, the rule could theoretically prohibit communication with a gov-
ernment employee only if that communication dealt with settlement is-
sues. Such an interpretation of the rule would be awkward to apply in
practice, however, since attorneys would be forced to cut off any conver-
sation during the course of an interview that seemed to be moving to-
ward a discussion of possible terms of settlement. From a functional
point of view, it seems more feasible simply to preclude all conver-
sation with a government employee deemed a "party."
68. See note 2 =pra.
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by others that are contrary to his own ethical obligations. 69
Thus, a represented party's opportunity to talk directly with
government employees about a controversy could be cut off solely
because he is represented.
To properly protect the government's interest, yet permit the
vast majority of day-to-day "settlements" to proceed unham-
pered, a different definition of "party" is required from the gen-
eral limitation to "executive" officials with the authority to bind
the agency in any dispute. In general, the advice of counsel is
apt to be most helpful to the government in cases involving the
kinds of issues likely to lead to litigation. Moreover, in terms
of the functioning of the legal system, the need to assure that
parties are represented by counsel is greatest when the parties
are engaged in a matter likely to lead to a lawsuit. Therefore,
the rule should be confined to situations involving either a liti-
gated issue or an issue likely to lead to litigation and then should
extend only to those individuals who have the authority to bind
the government to a settlement. This restricts the range of po-
tential parties for purposes of the rule to those government em-
ployees who would have the authority to act for the government
were a matter to be litigated,70 which would probably include,
in most situations, only a handful of high ranking officials within
an agency. 1 Not only would this test free the attorney from
69. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICs, OPINIONS, No. 95
(1933); No. 75 (1932). Cf. J.M. CLARK & C. WOLFRAM, supra note 53, at
731 (the word "cause" in DR 7-104 should be read, in view of the Code's
preamble, to include "permit" or "fail to restrain").
70. The Alaska Ethics Committee appears to have adopted this defi-
nition of the government party, at least in situations involving litigation.
In ALASKA BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS, No. 71-1 (1971), it held:
[T]he Committee's answer to the question posed is that a lawyer
is ethically permitted to communicate with employees of a gov-
ernmental entity concerning a matter in controversy between
the party represented by the lawyer and the governmental
entity, so long as that communication is not made with em-
ployees of the entity who may reasonably be thought of as rep-
resenting the entity in matters related to the matter in contro-
versy, and assuming that full disclosure of the lawyer's repre-
sentation and the connection of that representation to the com-
munication is made (emphasis added).
If "representing" refers to those individuals having the authority to
negotiate on behalf of the government entity, the Alaska interpretation
coincides with that suggested by this Note.
71. It may not always be obvious which officials within an agency
have the authority to settle a litigated dispute. Those having statutory
authority can be readily identified. Agency heads, however, often sub-
delegate authority to lower level officials. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TEXT §§ 9.01-.03 (3d ed. 1972). The definition of "party" for pur-
poses of DR 7-104 should be such that both those officials with statutory
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concern about violating the rule in most day-to-day contacts with
agencies, it would also forewarn him that once a matter had been
referred to a department head, the rule might apply.
1 2
The proposed restrictive definition need not unduly prejudice
the government's interests. An agency could decide on its own
initiative to further restrict access by private attorneys to gov-
ernment employees by, for example, simply informing all em-
ployees that they should refer inquiries from attorneys concern-
ing legal matters to the general counsel's office. This approach
places the burden, for the most part, on the government to deter-
mine whether, and under what circumstances, public access to
government should be curtailed and has the advantage of making
any restriction on government access a political determination
subject to attack through the political process.
III. WHEN THE RULE APPLIES
DR 7-104 governs only when a lawyer representing a client
seeks to communicate "on the subject of the representation with
a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter."
73
Without a narrow definition of "party," this language could be
interpreted to mean that the government is always a party repre-
sented by counsel, and hence that the rule is applicable to all
contacts. The United States government, for example, is always
represented by the Justice Department, and a state by its attor-
ney general, in whatever "matters" may arise. Defining "party"
to mean an official with the authority to settle a litigable matter
authority to bind the agency and those to whom such authority has been
subdelegated are included.
Whether an agency employee has the authority to bind the agency
to a settlement often depends upon the particular circumstances of a case.
As a practical matter, it may be difficult for an attorney unfamiliar with
internal agency operation to know to whom authority has been subdele-
gated. For this reason, an attorney contacting an official other than
someone statutorily authorized to settle a dispute should be allowed to
proceed as if communicating with a nonparty unless the attorney is
aware or informed of a specific subdelegation of authority to the person
contacted. If the contacting attorney were required to reveal the nature
of his representation and the purpose of his communication, see text fol-
lowing note 80 infra, this would, in most instances, be sufficient to lead
the contacted employee to inform the attorney of his authority, thus cut-
ting off further contacts, provided the timing requirement were also met,
see text accompanying notes 73-80 infra.
72. The point in time when the rule would apply is discussed in text
accompanying notes 73-80 infra.
73. ABA CoDE OF PROFEsSIONAL REsPoNsinLiTY DR 7-104(A) (1).
The entire text of DR 7-104 appears in note 2 supra.
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narrows the scope of the rule but does not solve the problem
of knowing when the official may be considered "represented."
One way to define "represented" for the purposes of the
rule's application to a party that always has in-house counsel
is to look to the relationship between the party and his opponent.
The headnote to DR 7-104--"communicating with one of adverse
interest"74 -suggests that the rule should not apply unless the
parties are actually engaged in a dispute or perhaps on the verge
of litigation. The rule, however, contains no further reference
to "adverseness" and at least one source has argued that the word
"adverse" should be ignored as a limitation on the rule's opera-
tion:
[U]nless "adverse" were defined so broadly as to include every
party who might then or at any time in the future have interests
that differed in any way from the contacting party, there would
seem to be dangers of uncounselled concessions of interest of the
kind that the rule apparently seeks to prevent.75
This argument has merit if the controversy involves private par-
ties, for most contacts between an outside attorney and a private
74. A footnote to the headnote of DR 7-104 suggests that the gov-
ernment's interest should never be considered adverse to the interests of
the public. The footnote quotes the California rule eliminating govern-
ment entities and officials from the class of parties with whom communi-
cation is prohibited. Although the quote may be intended merely as a
reference to a conflicting statute, it can also be interpreted as an aid to
construing the scope of the ABA rule's proscription. The footnotes to
the official ABA Code are not definitive, however; they are intended
merely to relate the provisions of the Code to other sources. ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIILITY, Preamble and Preliminary Statement,
n.1.
Even if the government might sometimes be considered an adverse
party, it is difficult to characterize certain government officials as per-
sons of "adverse interest" within the rule's terms because of the special
relationship of the government party with the public. This problem is
illustrated in an informal opinion issued by the Chairperson of the Maine
Ethics Committee in connection with litigation brought by certain Indian
tribes against the government:
Where the State of Maine is the real party in interest, there are
obvious problems about categorizing every state employee as
either a "party" or a person of "adverse interest." The dilemma
is illustrated by the suggestion of the Attorney-General's office
that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs should fall within the
meaning of the quoted language. The Commissioner obviously
owes a strong duty to the Indian people who are his constituency
as well as to the State from which his paychecks are issued.
The Governor also has divided loyalties which make it difficult
to categorize his interest as "adverse."
Letter from Curtis Webber, Chairperson, Ethics Committee of the Maine
Bar Association, to Thomas Tureen (Mar. 12, 1973) (on file with MIN-
NESOTA LAW REVIEw).
75. J.M. CLARK & C. WoLFRAm, supra note 53, at 727.
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party who is represented by counsel are likely to concern mat-
ters that are sharply in dispute or virtually certain to result in
a dispute. Even if this generalization is too broad, applying the
rule by ignoring adverseness in the context of private parties
works no particular hardship, for there are no overriding inter-
ests, such as the public's concern for easy access to the govern-
ment, at stake.
In the context of a government party, however, the require-
ment of adverseness is a sound one. Contacts with the govern-
ment, even with higher officials who are considered "parties,"
may often involve matters unlikely to lead to litigation or mat-
ters unlikely to result in serious conflict. Without a requirement
of adverseness, numerous communications could be hampered.
Just as the public's interest in the free exchange of information
requires a narrowing of the definition of "party", it also suggests
that the government party should be deemed "represented" only
when the citizen's and the government's interests clearly and
seriously conflict.
The test of when such adverseness exists must be based on
some objective external criteria or the rule will be unworkable.
The point at which a lawsuit is filed would be an obvious test,
but filing suit is an event too easily manipulated. Outside attor-
neys could merely gather all the information they needed and
then file suit, or settle before suit yet not be subject to disci-
pline even if the government official had consulted counsel30
These are precisely the situations the rule is designed to prevent.
A better approach is that taken by the New York State Bar:7r
the rule applies only when the public body involved has sought
legal assistance on a matter. This step by the agency clearly
indicates its belief that the matter is seriously in conflict or likely
to lead to litigation, and, therefore, that all further communica-
tion should be channeled through counsel. The language of DR
7-104 itself suggests this result, for the rule covers situations in
which a party is represented "in that matter." Thus, until the
government's attorney has been contacted about a particular dis-
76. See ABA Coimv. ON PROFESSIONAL ETIcs, OPINIONS, No. 1524
(1962) (Informal Opinion) (DR 7-104 does not apply only to "litigated
matters").
77. The New York State Bar in a 1970 opinion decided that a gov-
ernment body could be said to be represented by counsel only if counsel
were "designated" for a particular '"matter." NEw YoRK STATE BAR
Ass'N, OpmioNs, No. 160 (1970).
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pute, opposing counsel should be allowed to proceed as if the
government were not a represented party.78
It may not be obvious to the attorney seeking information
whether a government attorney has become involved in the case.
DR 7-104 requires an attorney to refrain from communicating
with a party he "knows to be represented by a lawyer,"7 9 but
seems to impose no obligation on the attorney to inquire whether
counsel has been retained. Particularly in contacts with higher
level government officials," such an affirmative obligation ap-
pears to be unnecessary. The attorney should merely be required
to identify himself and the purpose of his inquiry; it is very un-
likely that a government official, at that point, would fail to in-
form the attorney in response that the matter had been turned
over to the agency's counsel. Once informed of that fact, the
attorney would be ethically obliged to refrain from further dis-
cussions with the official without the permission of the agency's
lawyer. Unless he were so informed, or otherwise knew that
the government had entrusted the matter to its counsel, however,
the contacting attorney could proceed as if the government were
unrepresented.
IV. DR 7-104 (A) (2)
If the government is a represented party under the rule only
after counsel has been brought in on a particular matter, the
government would seem to be a person who is not represented
under DR 7-104 (A) (2) prior to this time. That subsection of the
rule prohibits an attorney from giving advice, other than the ad-
vice to seek counsel, to a person not represented by a lawyer
78. See ALASKA BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS, No. 71-1 (1971), discussed at
note 70 supra. See also FLORIDA BAR ASS'N, OPINIONS, No. 68-20 (1968),
reprinted in 44 FLA. B.J. 404 (1970) (an attorney representing a client
before the state highway department could contact members of the de-
partment or its employees without seeking permission, as long as the
matter in question had not been referred to the department's legal ad-
visor).
79. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBILrrY DR 7-104 (A) (1).
The entire text of DR 7-104 appears in note 2 supra.
80. Under the interpretation of DR 7-104 suggested by this Note,
lower level employees who might not know when to consult an attorney
would, in any event, not be considered parties and therefore would not
fall within the protection of the rule. Although the government could
provide lower level employees with legal advice in dealing with outside
attorneys, see note 71 supra, the burden of initiating this policy should
rest with the government. Cf. MICHIGAN BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS, No. CI-266
(1976) (Informal Opinion) (university attorney does not automatically
represent all employees).
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"if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibil-
ity of being in conflict with the interests of his client."81 A broad
reading of this section of the rule could pose serious problems.
Conceivably, for example, it could mean that an attorney could
not discuss with a government agency his client's opposition to
or recommendations on a rule or regulation the agency was
promulgating because this would constitute "advice." While it
is perhaps unlikely that the proscription would be so broadly
construed,82 its application to the government nevertheless re-
mains uncertain. The rationale for the rule seems to be that
an attorney should not take advantage of an uncounseled lay per-
son before that person is even aware that he needs legal advice.
The opposing attorney's advice thus alerts him to seek assistance
he might otherwise forego. Government personnel, however, al-
ways have access to counsel, and the government agency itself
is in a position to ensure that its employees are made fully aware
of the kinds of situations in which they should consult counsel.
Thus, since there is far less danger of overreaching by an attor-
ney when contact is with the government, DR 7-104(A) (2) should
not apply.
V. CONCLUSION
When interpreting DR 7-104 in a government context, two
competing considerations must be balanced: (1) the desirability
of affording the government, as a party, the same kinds of protec-
tion against uncounseled concessions of 'interest afforded other
parties, and (2) the desirability of ensuring largely unrestricted
public access to government as a check against mismanagement
and malfeasance. DR 7-104, perhaps because it has emerged
largely unchanged from a period when litigation against the gov-
ernment probably was not prevalent, and, therefore, not of major
concern to the legal profession, does not adequately accommodate
these concerns. Given the frequency of attorneys' contacts with
government bodies today, and given the ambiguity inherent in
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsIBmITY DR 7-104(A) (2).
The entire text of DR 7-104 appears in note 2 supra.
82. Such a restriction could pose constitutional problems. The right
to lobby the government is constitutionally protected. U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The traditional view has limited the right to petition to
addressing legislatures concerning changes in statutory laws. See United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876); Note, The Right of Petition,
55 W. VA. L. REv. 275, 278-79 (1953). The language of the amendment
itself, however, is not so confined and suggests that the right extends to
all branches of government.
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the rule as it presently exists, an authoritative delineation by the
ABA or the state bars of the rule's application in a government
context is needed.
It is submitted that the rule should be narrowly construed
when contact with the government is sought. A government
"party" under the rule should be defined as any official who has
the authority to bind the government in a matter that could be
litigated. No restrictions should apply to communication with
other government employees, except that the attorney be re-
quired to disclose his identity and the nature of his representa-
tion. Finally, DR 7-104 should be triggered only when a matter
has been turned over to the government agency's legal counsel.
This interpretation of the rule best accommodates the conflicting
considerations that exist when the interests of the government
as a party are adverse to those of a member of the public it is
charged to serve.
